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KEEP SECURITIES REFORM MOVING: 
ELIMINATE THE SEC’S INTEGRATION DOCTRINE 
Stuart R. Cohn* 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE 
Small businesses are regarded as the engine that drives economic 
growth.1 Success generally requires that early stage companies be fed 
with sufficient infusions of capital often. It is therefore imperative that a 
national policy of economic growth provide adequate capital-formation 
opportunities for developing companies. The principal federal statute 
regulating the offer and sale of securities is the Securities Act of 1933 
(“1933 Act” or “Act”).2 The 1933 Act mandates a formal registration 
process for all offers and sales of securities unless an exemption from 
registration exists.3 Unfortunately, start-ups and developing companies 
cannot, as a practical matter, raise capital under the expensive, time-
consuming process of registration.4 After having tapped out the 
founders’ and their families’ resources, the only capital-raising 
alternative for most companies not blessed with venture capital or angel  
 
                                                          
 * Sam T. Dell Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. I would like 
to acknowledge the excellent substantive and editing suggestions by Professor Marc I. Steinberg, 
Darryl B. Deaktor, and by my research assistant Shara Scottland. 
 1. See Proclamation No. 9121, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,721 (May 9, 2014) (“Small businesses 
represent an ideal at the heart of our Nation’s promise—that with ingenuity and hard work, anyone 
can build a better life. They are also the lifeblood of our economy, employing half of our country’s 
workforce and creating nearly two out of every three new American jobs.”); SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL 
REPORT 10 (2006) (“Small businesses pump billions into the economy. They are, in many ways, 
what makes America great.”). 
 2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012). 
 3. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a) (“Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, 
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . to sell such security through the use or 
medium of any prospectus or otherwise . . . .”). For a discussion of exemptions from the registration 
mandate, see infra Part II. 
 4. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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financing5 is to utilize registration exemptions that fit the company’s 
condition and needs. 
In light of the desire to foster small business growth, it might be 
thought that registration exemptions would readily facilitate small 
business capital financing. That is not the case. Every registration 
exemption imposes substantial conditions upon a small company’s 
ability to raise capital on an as-needed basis.6 A growing recognition of 
the capital-formation problems has led to several statutory and 
regulatory reforms in recent years.7 Those reforms, however, have not 
touched one of the principal impediments to effective financing—
namely the so-called “integration doctrine,” a concept created by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) that 
may thwart or invalidate efforts by companies to raise capital through 
successive securities offerings.8 This agency-created doctrine is  
both contrary and anachronistic to reform efforts to ease capital-
formation capacities. The reform efforts to date will not bear fruit in the 
manner intended unless the integration doctrine is eliminated or 
significantly modified. 
The integration doctrine, described more fully below,9 is raised 
whenever a company engages in two or more securities offerings within 
a relatively short time frame—something not at all uncommon among 
capital-hungry young companies.10 The doctrine, which contains both 
safe harbor time frames and an SEC-developed five-factor test,11 
requires that when companies engage in successive offerings, those 
offerings be examined as a whole to determine whether the separate 
                                                          
 5. Venture capital companies and individual “angel” financiers provide substantial equity 
financing to small and developing companies. DANIEL H. ARONSON, VENTURE CAPITAL: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDEBOOK FOR BUSINESS OWNERS, MANAGERS AND ADVISORS 11-12 (5th ed. 2011). 
Only a small fraction of all applicants for venture capital or angel financing are successful in their 
applications. Id. at 15. 
 6. Conditions vary among exemptions. Among the more significant conditions are the 
intrastate exemptions under section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) Rule 147, which limit the location of offerees and purchasers and the scope of 
the issuer’s business. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11); 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2014). Rule 504, 
Rule 505, and Regulation A impose monetary ceilings on the amounts that can be raised. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 230.504(b)(2), .505(b)(2), .251(b). Rules 505 and 506(b) impose numerical limitations on the 
number of investors who are not so-called “accredited investors,” and Rule 506(c) is limited to so-
called “accredited investors.” Id. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), .506(b)–(c). For a fuller description of the 
limitations and conditions imposed by the various exemptions, see generally Stuart R. Cohn & 
Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing Failure to Address Small Business 
Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2007). 
 7. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
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securities sales can functionally be deemed to be portions of a single 
offering.12 If so, the deemed combined offering must meet a  
single registration exemption, regardless of whether each of the distinct 
parts was offered and sold in complete accordance with an  
existing exemption.13 
The integration doctrine can be illustrated as follows: A young 
start-up company has tapped out the resources of its owners and friends 
and needs to raise somewhere between $1 million and $1.5 million to 
keep itself moving forward. A Rule 506(b) private offering arranged 
through an investment adviser raises $400,000.14 Three months later, the 
company advertises for accredited investors pursuant to the Rule 506(c) 
exemption and raises $1 million.15 The investors in both offerings are 
given complete information about the company, understand the risks of 
their investments, and each of the transactions conform to their 
respective registration exemption requirements, but for the issue of 
integration. From an investor protection perspective, there should be no 
policy basis to invalidate either of the offerings. Yet, the SEC, or one of 
the purchasers who later regrets the investment, can charge that the two 
offerings should be “integrated” as one, and that the deemed combined 
offering violates the securities laws. If the charges are successful, which 
is a likely prospect given the breadth of the integration doctrine,16 the 
                                                          
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. The integration doctrine was described in an SEC release as follows:  
The integration doctrine provides an analytical framework for determining whether 
multiple securities transactions should be considered part of the same offering 
[(integrated)]. This analysis helps to determine whether registration under Section 5 of 
the Securities Act is required or an exemption [from registration] is available for the 
entire offering. The integration doctrine, which has existed since 1933, prevents an issuer 
from improperly avoiding registration by artificially dividing a single offering so that 
Securities Act exemptions appear to apply to the individual parts where none would be 
available for the whole. 
Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7943, 74 SEC Docket 571 (Jan. 26, 
2001). 
 14. Rule 506(b) of Regulation D allows a company to raise an unlimited amount of funds, 
provided that there are no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors who themselves, or 
through a purchaser representative, have experience and knowledge in making investments in such 
offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014).  
 15. Rule 506(c) of Regulation D allows issuers to utilize general advertising and general 
solicitation for purchasers as long as all purchasers are accredited investors. Id. § 230.506(c).  
 16. Given the relatively short time span between offerings and the fact that the money raised 
in each offering was for working capital purposes, integration of the offerings under the SEC’s five-
factor test is likely. For a description of the five-factor test, see infra text accompanying note 63. If 
combined, the deemed unitary offering will not satisfy Rule 506(b) because the latter offering was 
publicly advertised (which is prohibited for a Rule 506(b) offering), and will not satisfy Rule 506(c) 
because there were non-accredited investors in the earlier offering (which is prohibited in a Rule 
506(c) offering). See id. § 230.506(b)–(c). Nor would any other exemption likely be available. 
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result may be an SEC or judicial order requiring the company to return 
all of the offering proceeds to the securities purchasers.17 What has been 
gained other than the likely demise of a young company? The answer is 
nothing, other than adherence to a formalistic doctrine that hampers the 
capital-raising capacities of small businesses. 
Integration would not be a serious problem if issuers could readily 
fit successive offerings into a single exemption. Unfortunately, 
registration exemptions are so loaded with technical requirements and 
conditions that the integration doctrine, when applied, will almost 
invariably result in the issuer being unable to satisfy any exemption for 
the deemed unitary offering.18 An issuer that sold securities under one 
exemption and is now faced with an unplanned integration problem is 
highly unlikely to be able to bring a deemed combined offering under 
the original or any other exemption.19 Thus, a company that needs to 
raise capital more than once during a relatively short time period may 
find either that: (1) it cannot do so under the integration doctrine; or (2) 
alternatively, the company’s distinct offerings are deemed to be one 
offering which, in the deemed combined form, violates the 1933 Act by 
failing to meet the requirements of any registration exemption. Neither 
of these results serves the goal of providing capital-formation 
opportunities for small businesses. Moreover, the integration doctrine 
fails to serve the fundamental goal of providing investor protection in 
the capital-raising process.20 That basic goal, as well as the goal of 
promoting capital formation, are now ingrained in the 1933 Act, which 
Congress amended in 1996 to specifically state that the Commission, in 
its rule-making process, must “consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”21 If, as will be examined below, each registration 
exemption contains substantive investor protection requirements,22 the 
integration doctrine adds nothing to the achievement of any of the 
express goals. The doctrine was wrong from its inception, serves no 
                                                          
 17. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012). Section 12(a)(1) of the 
1933 Act provides for rescission, plus interest, for all purchasers to whom the issuer is liable for 
engaging in a violation of the registration requirement, or damages for those purchasers who no 
longer own the security. Id. 
 18. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 6, at 15-25. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.  
 20. For a discussion of the 1933 Act’s goal of investor protection, see infra text 
accompanying notes 145-48. 
 21. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b). Section 2(b) was added by the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424. 
 22. For a discussion of investor protection elements within the various registration 
exemptions, see infra Part IV. 
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valid purpose, is a major hindrance to capital formation, and should be 
eliminated except in the most limited circumstances. 
Part II of this Article briefly describes the statutory and regulatory 
registration exemptions provided by the 1933 Act that allow for capital-
raising opportunities by smaller companies.23 Part III discusses the 
historical development of the integration doctrine, its initial and later 
justifications, and representative applications through no-action letters 
and judicial decisions.24 Part IV critiques the arguments supporting the 
doctrine and explores the doctrine’s inherent ambiguities and 
inconsistencies.25 Part V examines the issue of investor protection with 
respect to registration exemptions to determine whether the integration 
doctrine is a necessary adjunct to this fundamental goal of the securities 
laws.26 Part VI recommends that the integration doctrine be eliminated in 
its entirety, except for a limited role with regard to the Rule 504 and 
Rule 505 numerically based registration exemptions.27 
II. CAPITAL RAISING BY SMALL- AND MEDIUM- SIZED COMPANIES 
The 1933 Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first piece of New 
Deal legislation, was a response to the enormous investment losses 
incurred in the early years of the Great Depression.28 The 1933 Act 
mandates a federal scheme of registration for securities offerings, but 
exempts from such a mandate certain offerings that meet statutory 
registration exemptions or any future agency-created registration 
exemptions.29 The 1933 Act creates two statutory exemptions from 
registration: (1) the so-called “intrastate exemption,” for when the issuer 
and all offerees and purchasers of securities are residents within the 
same state;30 and (2) the so-called “private offering exemption,” for 
                                                          
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27. See infra Part VI. 
 28. LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 25 (2d ed. 1988) (“When the 
Crash of 1929, followed by the Great Depression, finally led to the passage of the Securities Act of 
1933 during the ‘hundred glorious days’ of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the first problem was 
determining what the role of the federal government should be in the protection of investors.”). 
 29. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act 
authorizes the addition of other exemptions through administrative adoption. Securities Act of 1933 
§ 3(b). 
 30. Id. § 3(a)(11) (exempting from registration “[a]ny security which is a part of an issue 
offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such 
security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and 
doing business within, such State or Territory”).  
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transactions “not involving any public offering.”31 The Act provides that 
these statutory exemptions could be augmented by regulatory 
exemptions adopted where the agency administering the statute 
determines that registration “is not necessary in the public interest and 
for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or 
the limited character of the public offering.”32 
The term “public interest” was not defined in the 1933 Act. One 
universally acknowledged element of public interest was, and remains, 
the capacity of small companies to raise capital quickly and 
inexpensively.33 Capital needs of smaller companies are often sporadic 
and continual as a result of limited or non-existent revenue streams and 
uncertain research and development expenses.34 Working capital is often 
exhausted rapidly and must be continually supplemented as progress (or 
lack thereof) demands.35 The registration process is, unfortunately, 
extremely expensive, and time- and energy-consuming.36 Cost, timing, 
and marketing factors create a far too heavy burden relative to the size 
and capital needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises.37 The 1933 
Act’s provisions for statutory and administrative registration exemptions 
reflect the understanding that small and developing companies will 
necessarily need to raise capital other than through registration.38 
                                                          
 31. Id. § 4(a)(2). This provision was originally section 4(1) of the 1933 Act. It became section 
4(2) as a result of certain amendments in 1964, and became section 4(a)(2) as a result of 
amendments enacted under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”). See 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(b)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 314 (2012); 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 565, 580. 
 32. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1). The ceiling for such regulatory exemptions, initially set 
at $100,000, has been raised several times and is currently at $5 million. Id. The JOBS Act added 
section 3(b)(2), authorizing the SEC to adopt rules exempting from registration certain offerings up 
to $50 million annually. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401(a)(2); see Securities Act of 
1933 § 3(b)(2). Pursuant to such authority, the Commission adopted revised Regulation A 
exemptions providing a Tier 1 exemption for offerings up to $20 million and a Tier 2 exemption for 
offerings up to $50 million. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the 
Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, 
Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr. 20, 2015).  
 33. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
 34. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 6, at 47. 
 35. The venture capital industry is well acquainted with this phenomenon and has devised 
elaborate arrangements to account for multiple so-called “down-rounds” of additional investments. 
 36. See, e.g., PWC, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY 
SURPRISE YOU 1 (2012) (“In addition to underwriter fees, on average companies incur $3.7 million 
of costs directly attributable to their IPO.”). Companies that engage in a registered offering are 
required to be public reporting companies for at least one year thereafter, regardless of their size or 
number of shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)(1) (2012). 
The periodic reporting requirements, which include annual audited financial statements, impose 
considerable expense upon all reporting companies. PWC, supra at 13-14. 
 37. See PWC, supra note 36, at 13-14. 
 38. See, e.g., Manuel F. Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of 
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Under its delegated authority, the SEC has created several 
registration exemptions. The first was Regulation A—a kind of modified 
registration that requires pre-offering submission of a disclosure 
document to the SEC for its review and comment.39 Subsequently, under 
pressure from the securities bar and the small business community, the 
SEC adopted several additional registration exemptions: (1) the Rule 
147 exemption for intrastate offerings;40 (2) the Rule 504 exemption for 
offerings up to $1 million;41 (3) the Rule 505 exemption for offerings up 
to $5 million;42 and (4) the Rule 506 exemption for private offerings of 
unlimited amounts.43 Meanwhile, Congress also took note of the need 
for additional registration exemptions, and in 1980, Congress added 
section 4(5) to the 1933 Act—a self-executing statutory exemption 
limited to so-called “accredited investors.”44 
Despite the somewhat broad menu of registration exemptions, small 
businesses and their advocates continued to press for reform due to the 
difficult and technical requirements often imposed as conditions to the 
various exemptions.45 As a result, there have been several reforms and 
modifications to the exemptions. Among the reforms, the Commission 
                                                          
Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 148-49 (1959) (“The [exemptions in the 1933 Act] reflect a 
Congressional determination to temper the full effect of the statute as against offerings by small 
business concerns . . . .”). Manuel Cohen served as Chair of the SEC from 1964 to 1969. SEC 
Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).  
 39. Regulation A consists of SEC Rules 251 through 263. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2014). 
In April 2015, Regulation A was amended to provide for two types of Regulation A offerings, 
Tier 1 for offerings up to $20 million and Tier 2 for offerings up to $50 million. Amendments for 
Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act 
Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 
Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
 40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147. 
 41. Id. § 230.504.  
 42. Id. § 230.505. 
 43. Id. § 230.506.  
 44. Section 4(5) was initially added as section 4(6) through the Small Business Investment 
Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 602, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294. In 2010, Congress later 
redesignated section 4(6) as section 4(5). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 944(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1897-98 (2010). This statutory exemption has 
proven to be of little importance because it is limited to $5 million and is not as flexible in terms of 
amount to be raised or the nature of the purchasers as either Rule 505 or Rule 506. See Securities 
Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2012); §§ 230.505–.506. 
 45. An annual conference between the SEC and representatives of small business interests is 
mandated by section 503 of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980. See Small 
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 § 503. The report of each conference contains reform 
recommendations proposed by conference participants. The annual reports can be accessed on the 
SEC’s website. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/info/smallbusiness/ 
sbforumreps.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
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added a “substantial compliance” provision to Regulation D;46 revised 
Regulation A to allow for preliminary “testing the waters” solicitations 
of potential investors prior to filing an offering circular;47 and 
eliminated, for Rule 504 offerings, both the prohibition against general 
advertising and solicitation and the provision that securities sold are 
restricted securities, provided that such offerings were state registered or 
sold exclusively under state accredited investor exemptions.48 
Legislative reforms in 1996 preempted state registration laws with 
respect to so-called “covered securities,” which included offerings under 
the Rule 506 private offering exemption.49 Most recently, the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”)50 took a threefold stab 
at reform by: (1) creating a so-called “crowdfunding exemption” 
intended to allow small companies to raise up to $1 million through 
internet-based offerings;51 (2) mandating that the SEC revise its Rule 
506 private offering exemption to allow general advertising and 
solicitation in offerings limited to accredited investors;52 and (3) 
directing the SEC to develop a new Regulation A-type exemption for 
offerings up to $50 million.53 
While the various reform measures have eased some of the 
exemption limitations, the integration doctrine remains untouched and 
applicable to every exempt offering, therefore continuing to be an 
                                                          
 46. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (expressing the result of “[i]nsignificant [d]eviations from a [t]erm, 
[c]ondition or [r]equirement of Regulation D”). 
 47. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, Exchange Act Release No. 
30,968, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2287, 51 SEC Docket 2154 (July 30, 1992).  
 48. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the “Seed Capital” Exemption, Securities Act 
Release No. 7644, 69 SEC Docket 364 (Feb. 25, 1999). Rule 502(c) of Regulation D prohibits 
general advertising and general solicitation in connection with Regulation D offerings, and 
Rule 502(d) provides that securities obtained in a Regulation D offering “cannot be resold without 
registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)–(d).  
 49. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-290, § 102, 110 
Stat. 3416, 3417-19. 
 50. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). The 
JOBS Act consists of seven titles modifying existing securities law provisions or mandating the 
SEC to undertake certain reform measures. Id. § 2.  
 51. Id. § 302.  
 52. Id. § 201(a)(1). Rule 506(c), allowing general advertising and solicitation in private 
offerings where the sole purchasers are accredited investors, was adopted in 2013. Eliminating the 
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A 
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. 3624, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,774-76, 44,778 (July 24, 2013). 
 53. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401(a)(2). Pursuant to Congress’s directive, the 
SEC adopted revisions to Regulation A in 2015. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues 
Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange 
Act Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr. 
20, 2015).  
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obstacle to small business financing. The doctrine’s perseverance is not 
due to the SEC’s ignorance of its effects. On the contrary, the 
Commission has expressly acknowledged “the burdens that the 
integration doctrine place on capital formation.”54 One can appreciate 
the Commission’s concern that registration exemptions should not open 
the door to securities offerings that may be misused contrary to 
fundamental policy.55 However, the Commission’s intransigence on the 
integration doctrine is difficult to understand given the doctrine’s lack of 
clear statutory basis and adverse impact upon the efforts to improve the 
capital-raising opportunities of small businesses. The recent critique by 
SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, stating that “our focus should 
be on aligning our exemptions with the ways in which companies raise 
capital, rather than shoehorning capital-raising techniques into existing, 
complicated exemptions,”56 and that “rarely do we remove any of our 
rules, even after they have long since ceased to serve their purpose or 
have become obsolete or worse,”57 is particularly apt to the continuing 
problems created by the integration doctrine. 
III. THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
The integration doctrine is far easier to describe than to justify, 
although description necessarily includes such vague terms as “single 
plan of financing” and “same general purpose.”58 The doctrine has a 
heavy bite. It has no good faith, substantial compliance, or advice of 
counsel defenses. If applied, the doctrine’s result is inevitably a violation 
of the 1933 Act’s section 12(a)(1) prohibition against improperly 
offering or selling unregistered securities.59 The origin and purported 
justification for this harsh result, therefore, need careful examination. 
                                                          
 54. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 
8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
 55. See James D. Cox, Who Can’t Raise Capital?: The Scylla and Charybdis of Capital 
Formation, 102 KY. L.J. 849, 849 (2014) (“While the regulatory bodies share the common goal of 
investor protection, the Securities and Exchange Commission also has among its stated objectives 
the promotion of capital formation. Thus, it finds itself frequently faced with the conflicting tugs of 
investor needs and calls for less friction on capital formation and the operation of the securities 
markets.”). 
 56. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Whatever Happened to Promoting 
Small Business Capital Formation? (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/ 
Speech/1370542976550.  
 57. Id.  
 58. For reference to these terms in the SEC’s five-factor test, see infra text accompanying 
note 63. 
 59. For remedies provided under section 12(a)(1), see infra text accompanying note 70. 
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A. Basic Elements and Application 
Whenever a company engages in two or more securities offerings, 
the integration doctrine requires that those offerings be analyzed to 
determine whether they are in fact distinct or, on the contrary, can be 
functionally deemed to be two parts of a single offering.60 If the multiple 
offerings are deemed to be functionally one offering, that single offering, 
in its combined form, must satisfy a registration exemption.61 Analysis is 
based upon a five-factor integration test developed by the SEC.62 The 
five-factor test asks whether the offers and sales effected in the 
apparently distinct offerings: 
(1) “are part of a single plan of financing;” 
(2) “involve issuance of the same class of securities;” 
(3) “have been made at or about the same time;” 
(4) “involve the same type of consideration being received; and” 
(5) “are made for the same general purpose.”63 
Application of the five-factor test can be illustrated by the 
following example: In January, an issuer engages in an intrastate 
offering exempted under the statutory section 3(a)(11) intrastate offering 
registration exemption.64 Five months later, in May, the issuer sells 
shares to investors in a private offering that satisfies all the elements of 
the statutory section 4(a)(2) registration exemption.65 Although each 
offering satisfies its respective exemption requirements (but for 
integration), the fact of successive offerings may cause the SEC or any 
of the purchasers in either of the two offerings to raise the integration 
doctrine. The January and May offerings would then be examined using 
the five-factor test to determine whether they can functionally be 
deemed to be related portions of a single offering. The SEC has never 
indicated which of the five factors is the most prominent, but no-action 
letters66 historically indicate that the principal inquiry would be whether 
                                                          
 60. For the SEC’s description of the integration doctrine, see supra note 13. 
 61. See Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 492 
(1979).  
 62. The five-factor test was initially set forth in an SEC Release. Section 3(a)(11) Exemption 
for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961 WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6, 1961). It has 
subsequently been repeated in Rule 147 and Rule 502 of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147, 
.502(a) (2014). 
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).  
 64. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).  
 65. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2) (providing that the registration requirement of section 5 
“shall not apply to . . . transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering”). 
 66. No-action letters are requests to SEC staff from issuers, usually from their counsel, to 
consider whether, in the circumstances described in the issuer’s letter, the staff would agree that the 
SEC should take “no action” if the offering went forward as proposed. No-Action Letters, U.S. SEC. 
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the two offerings were “part of a single plan of financing.”67 If this 
vague factor is deemed to exist, the two offerings will be regarded as 
one, and that unitary offering must satisfy the conditions of a single 
registration exemption. When the offerings are deemed combined, the 
result may well be (and usually is) a failure to meet any registration 
exemption. In this example, if a single investor in the May private 
offering was not a resident of the issuer’s home state, the combined 
offerings could not satisfy the section 3(a)(11) intrastate exemption.68 
Likewise, if one or more of the purchasers in the January intrastate 
offering did not qualify as a “sophisticated” investor for private offering 
exemption purposes, the combined offering cannot satisfy the private 
offering exemption.69 When combined, the offerings will not satisfy any 
registration exemption, and therefore, both will be in violation of the 
1933 Act, despite each of the two offerings’ individual compliance with 
their respective exemption requirements. For purchasers in either 
offering, section 12(a)(1) provides for rescission plus statutory interest, 
or damages if the stock has already been resold at a loss.70 In an SEC 
enforcement action, the issuer could be required to return all of the 
offering proceeds to the investors.71 Sanctions and remedies are imposed 
despite adherence by the company to the conditions of each of the two 
offering exemptions. The integration doctrine has the curious effect, in 
this instance and others, of inverting the maxim that “two wrongs don’t 
make a right” into “two rights make a wrong.” 
The integration doctrine can be peculiarly perverse when applied to 
good faith securities sales by young companies. Suppose that founders 
of a start-up sell some shares to a diverse group of college friends in 
privately arranged transactions. It is possible, indeed likely, that one or 
more of these several friends did not meet the “sophistication” standards 
of the private offering exemption.72 The friends willingly undertook the 
                                                          
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 
2012). 
 67. Deaktor, supra note 61, at 529 (“This component [(single plan of financing)] has emerged 
in many administrative and judicial proceedings . . . as one of the most influential of the traditional 
integration factors.”). 
 68. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11) (requiring all offerees and purchasers in a section 
3(a)(11) offering to be residents of the same state). 
 69. See id. § 4(a)(2). All offerees and purchasers in a section 4(a)(2) offering must meet a 
“sophistication” requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 152-58. 
 70. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a).  
 71. Id. § 8A(e) (authorizing the SEC to seek disgorgement from companies that have violated 
the 1933 Act). 
 72. Both the section 4(a)(2) and Rule 506(b) private offering exemptions require a degree of 
purchaser sophistication, although Rule 506(b) expressly permits otherwise unqualified purchasers 
to utilize so-called “purchaser representatives” who do meet the qualifications. 17 C.F.R. 
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risk and are not likely to care about compliance with exemption 
technicalities even if their shares lose value. Several months later the 
start-up needs a much larger infusion of capital and engages in a 
carefully structured Rule 506(b) exempt offering. The purchasers this 
time are sophisticated investors who look upon their investment in a 
much more cold-hearted manner. If the company’s fortunes fail to meet 
expectations, any one of the later investors could charge the company 
with a violation of exemption conditions, based not on the Rule 506(b) 
offering they participated in, but on an alleged integration of the prior 
and subsequent offerings.73 The later Rule 506(b) offering will be 
deemed invalid if combined with the earlier offering to friends who were 
not qualified purchasers under Rule 506(b). The result would give a right 
of rescission to all purchasers of the securities, which the later 
purchasers may well assert if their investment has not met expectations. 
Any such claims may be devastating to the company, which likely had 
already spent the funds raised in the offerings and may have insufficient 
capital to repay the purchasers. The result could be company insolvency, 
as well as personal liability for the founders who helped sell the 
securities.74 One must wonder about the justification for such a 
potentially dark scenario when contrasted with the need to accommodate 
the good faith capital-formation efforts by small businesses. 
B. History and Justification 
During the first year of the 1933 Act, a question arose of whether a 
company that had filed a registration statement could sell a portion of the 
proposed registered securities before the registration became effective by 
utilizing the section 3(a)(11) intrastate registration exemption.75 Any 
unsold securities would be offered throughout the country when the 
registration became effective.76 At that time the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) handled securities questions, as the SEC was not 
created until 1934.77 The FTC’s response to the proposed dual offering 
process was negative, concluding without further explanation that selling  
 
                                                          
§ 230.506(b); see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2); infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.  
 73. The statute of limitation for claims based on registration violations is one year after the 
violation occurred and in no event more than three years after the security was first offered to the 
public. Securities Act of 1933 § 13.  
 74. See supra text accompanying note 70 for a discussion of section 12(a)(1) remedies. 
 75. See Securities Act Release No. 97, 1933 WL 28905, at *5 (Dec. 28, 1933). 
 76. See id.  
 77. The SEC was formed pursuant to section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).  
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“part of an issue” under the intrastate exemption and the remainder 
under a registration statement would be in violation of the Act.78 
The first adjudication to give content to the integration doctrine was 
the SEC’s administrative ruling In the Matter of Unity Gold Corp.,79 
involving a company that sold 75,000 of its shares in March 1937 to its 
CEO under a then-existing registration exemption, while concurrently 
filing a registration statement for the planned sale of 619,000 shares to 
the public.80 The SEC charged, and then concluded, that the initial sale 
to the CEO was “part of the same ‘issue’” as the shares covered by the 
registration statement.81 The Commission found it “clear” that the sale to 
the CEO and the registered offering “involved a single, integrated 
plan.”82 When integrated with the planned registered offering, the  
sale to the CEO came under no exemption and therefore violated the 
1933 Act.83 Thus was born the integration doctrine. The SEC decision 
did not address the question of why, as in why can an issuer not engage 
in two or more offerings utilizing different elements of the 1933 Act and 
its regulations. The response that such offerings are a “single, integrated 
plan” begged the question as to why the issuer was precluded from 
relying concurrently on multiple statutory and regulatory provisions. 
Even assuming a “single, integrated plan” of stock distribution,  
what statutory or policy justification exists that requires that coordinated 
stock transactions be completed under a single statutory or  
regulatory provision? 
The SEC’s initial justification for the integration doctrine was set 
forth in a 1961 SEC Interpretive Release (“1961 Release”) that based 
application of the doctrine for intrastate offerings on the statutory phrase 
“part of an issue” found in the section 3(a)(11) exemption.84 The 1961 
Release noted that “[w]hether an offering is ‘part of an issue’ that is, 
                                                          
 78. Securities Act Release No. 97, 1933 WL 28905, at *5. This was not a true integration 
question; rather, it was a question of whether the identical securities that were being registered 
could be simultaneously offered and sold under a registration exemption. Had the issuer wanted to 
sell, for example, 100,000 shares in the registered offering and concurrently, or within a short time 
frame, sell an additional 25,000 other shares in an intrastate offering, that would have posed a truer 
integration question. 
 79. Securities Act Release No. 530, 1938 WL 34099 (July 19, 1938). 
 80. See id. at *3, *5.  
 81. Id. at *6.  
 82. Id. The two factors noted by the Commission as relevant in determining integration were: 
(1) the methods of sale and distribution; and (2) the use of the proceeds. Id. The Commission’s 
ruling concluded that “securities of the same class, offered on the same general terms to the public 
in an uninterrupted program of distribution, cannot be segregated into separate ‘issues’ merely by 
claiming an exemption for a limited portion of such shares.” Id. 
 83. See id.  
 84. Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961 
WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6, 1961). See supra note 30 for the text of section 3(a)(11). 
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whether it is an integrated part of an offering previously made or 
proposed to be made, is a question of fact and depends essentially upon 
whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or program.”85 The 
semantic “part of an issue” reed was thin support for the integration 
doctrine, particularly as the term is both ambiguous and not used in any 
other registration exemption. Thus, a broader justification was needed. 
Less than one year later, the SEC, describing integration in the context 
of the section 4(2) private offering exemption, simply stated that the 
question was whether a private offering “should be regarded as a part of 
a larger offering made or to be made.”86 Determination would be based 
on the five-factor test set forth in the 1961 Release.87 
The Commission altered the integration doctrine in 1974 when it 
created a time-based “safe harbor” for offerings under its newly adopted 
Rule 147 intrastate exemption.88 The integration safe harbor was based 
on the absence of other offerings during the six months preceding and 
the six months following the Rule 147 offering.89 Integration would not 
be applicable to issuers able to wait out the six months prior to and after 
a current offering.90 For offerings less than six months apart, the five-
factor test would be applied to determine whether the offerings should 
be treated as one.91 The six-month safe harbors were later extended to 
the Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule 506 registration exemptions contained 
in Regulation D, which were adopted in 1982.92 At the same time, the 
                                                          
 85. Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local Offerings, 1961 WL 61651, at *1. 
 86. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1962 WL 69450, at *3 
(Nov. 6, 1962).  
 87. See id.; supra text accompanying note 63. 
 88. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b) (2014); Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities 
Act of 1933—“Part of an Issue,” “Person Resident,” and “Doing Business Within” for Purposes of 
Section 3(a)(11) of that Act, Securities Act Release No. 5450, 3 SEC Docket 349 (Jan. 7, 1974). 
 89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2). The Rule provides as follows: 
For purposes of this rule only, an issue shall be deemed not to include offers, offers to 
sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemption provided 
by section 3 or section 4(a)(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement filed 
under the Act, that take place prior to the six month period immediately preceding or 
after the six month period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales 
pursuant to this rule, Provided, That, there are during either of said six month periods no 
offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar class 
as those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to the rule. 
Id. 
 90. See id. The six-month periods apply only to offerings outside of those time frames that are 
made under section 3(b) or section 4(a)(2). See id. 
 91. For a description of the SEC’s five-factor test, see supra text accompanying note 63. 
 92. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Rule 502(a) contains the safe harbors applicable to 
Regulation D exemptions under Rules 504, 505, 506(b), and 506(c), and provides: 
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the start of a Regulation D 
offering or are made more than six months after completion of a Regulation D offering 
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Commission centered the justification for the integration doctrine on the 
notion of circumvention, stating that “[t]he integration doctrine prevents 
an issuer from circumventing the registration requirements . . . by 
claiming a separate exemption for each part of a series of transactions 
that constitute a single offering.”93 
The SEC’s “circumvention” concern has become the predominant 
justification for the integration doctrine, as reflected in a 2007 SEC 
Release stating as follows: “While we recognize the burdens that the 
integration doctrine places on capital formation, improper reliance on 
exemptions from registration harms investors by depriving them of the 
benefits of full and fair disclosure and the civil remedies that flow from 
registration.”94 The integration doctrine is, thus, intended by the 
Commission to preserve the primacy of registration as the principal 
means of offering securities, thereby thwarting efforts by companies to 
avoid registration by splitting offerings into segmented portions. The 
SEC’s justification for the doctrine appears to stem from the following 
line of reasoning: (a) the 1933 Act provides for registration as the 
principal means of creating investor protection; (b) exemptions from 
registration do not provide investor protection to the degree provided by 
registration; and (c) therefore, issuers cannot be allowed to split a single 
offering into distinct segments as a method to evade registration.95 
                                                          
will not be considered part of that Regulation D offering, so long as during those six 
month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the 
same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other than those 
offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in Rule 405 under 
the Act. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). 
 93. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 1983 WL 409415, 
at *13-14 (Mar. 3, 1983). Prior to reaching this conclusion, the SEC provided in its interpretative 
release that “[i]ntegration operates to identify the scope of a particular offering by considering the 
relationship between multiple transactions. It is premised on the concept that the Securities Act 
addresses discrete offerings and on the recognition that not every offering is in fact a discrete 
transaction.” Id. 
 94. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 
8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
 95. In its most recent comment on the integration doctrine, contained in the March 25, 2015, 
Release adopting amendments to Regulation A, the Commission asserted that the integration safe 
harbor provision in Regulation A “has historically provided . . . issuers, particularly smaller issuers 
whose capital needs often change, with valuable certainty as to the contours of a given offering and 
their eligibility for an exemption from Securities Act registration.” Amendments for Small and 
Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 
9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 
21,806, 21,818 (Apr. 20, 2015). It is quite probable that many small issuers would be willing to 
sacrifice the SEC’s purported “valuable certainty” for a standard that allows greater flexibility in 
raising capital. Indeed, it is appropriate to ask why “certainty” should be the normative doctrine for 
what even the SEC recognizes as the changing capital needs of small companies. And if certainty is 
an intended goal, much greater certainty would be achieved by eliminating the integration doctrine 
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE 
The integration doctrine has had its share of severe critics, both as 
to underlying policy and application. After exhaustively reviewing the 
history of the doctrine and its application, Professor Darryl Deaktor 
concluded that the SEC’s five-factor test “appears insufficiently focused 
to provide guidance for the structuring of complex financial 
arrangements,” and that the “generality of its language and the existence 
of substantial overlaps in the factors engender confusion.”96 Professor 
Rutherford Campbell was more blunt when he referred to the integration 
doctrine as “one of the most vexing and pointless concepts of the 
Securities Act of 1933.”97 American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
committees have weighed in more than once attempting to modify the 
doctrine,98 and even the SEC’s own advisory committee recommended a 
substantial revision of the doctrine.99 Despite all, the Commission has 
appeared oblivious to criticism. Given recent reform efforts, and the 
continuing adverse impact of the integration doctrine on the capacity to 
use registration exemptions, it is appropriate to revisit the doctrine to 
examine its purported justification and the problems associated with its 
definition and application. 
A. The Circumvention Justification 
The SEC’s principal justification for the integration doctrine centers 
on the primacy of the registration process to protect investors and the 
supposed lessening of such protection when companies engage in 
                                                          
rather than continuing its ambiguous standards. 
 96. Deaktor, supra note 61, at 541. 
 97. Rutherford B. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case for the Elimination of the Integration 
Doctrine Under the Securities Act of 1933, 89 KY. L.J. 289, 289 (2000). 
 98. There have been two attempts by ABA committees to seek modification of the integration 
provisions. Neither effort reached fruition. See A.B.A. Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., 
Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 BUS. LAW. 595, 
623-24 (1986); A.B.A. Subcomm. on P’ships, Trusts and Unincorporated Ass’ns, Integration of 
Partnership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1610-12 
(1982). 
 99. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release 
No. 8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007). The 
attendant SEC release provided: 
Our Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies advised that the six-month safe 
harbor period from integration provided in Rule 502(a) “represents an unnecessary 
restriction on companies that may very well be subject to changing financial 
circumstances, and weighs too heavily in favor of investor protection at the expense of 
capital formation” . . . . Based on their analysis of the issue, the Advisory Committee 
recommended that we shorten the integration safe harbor from six months to 30 days. 
Id. 
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exempt offerings.100 The justification’s premise, however, may be 
seriously doubted. While investor protection was unquestionably a major 
goal of the 1933 Act, nothing in that act suggests that registration must 
be preferred over exemptions in order to protect investors. The delegated 
agency authority to create regulatory exemptions specifically allows for 
exemptions where the registration requirement “is not necessary in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors.”101 The implicit 
premise is that registration exemptions will, through their own terms, 
provide sufficient investor safeguards, even if such safeguards are not 
equal to those provided by the registration process.102 Investor protection 
in exempt transactions was also preserved in the 1933 Act through the 
explicit application of the section 12(a)(2)103 and section 17104 antifraud 
provisions to registration exemptions.105 The premise that registration 
has primacy over exemptions because the former provides superior 
investor protection is thus not justified by examining the 1933 Act’s 
statutory provisions. 
The “circumvention” justification as a protection against 
registration evasion is also unconvincing. Granted that avoidance of 
registration might be the motivation in a small number of cases that 
involve split offerings, it is far more likely that such offerings are by 
companies that have no thought of evading registration, but simply have 
a legitimate need for immediate capital. Indeed, for nearly all small and 
developing companies, registration is not a realistic option.106 Small 
businesses do not have the time or resources to undertake a registered 
offering. The notion that companies might engage in multiple offerings 
in order to circumvent registration does not comport with reality, as such 
companies cannot practically engage in a registered offering even if 
multiple offerings were combined. To put it differently, if a company 
needs to raise additional capital shortly after having engaged in an 
exempt offering, its choices are not in fact registration or waiting 
                                                          
 100. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 101. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012). 
 102. Among the explicit investor protection elements in a registered offering are the mandated 
disclosure documents reviewed by the Commission staff and the statutory liability provisions of 
section 11 applicable to the issuer, directors, signors of the registration statement, underwriters, and 
experts. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a). 
 103. Id. § 12(a)(2). 
 104. Id. § 17. 
 105. Id. § 12(a)(2) (“Any person who . . . offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by 
the provisions of section 3[)] . . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes 
an untrue statement of a material fact . . . .”); id. § 17 (“The exemptions provided in section 3 shall 
not apply to the provisions of this section.”). 
 106. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of costs of a registered 
offering. 
20 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3 
multiple months before starting another offering. The goal is not to break 
the law, but to raise capital, which realistically can only be accomplished 
through a registration exemption. Thus, rather than deeming multiple 
offerings as a means to evade registration—a pejorative conclusion that 
implies bad motives—it is more appropriate to regard the multiple 
offerings as a company’s effort to maximize its capital-formation 
opportunities within the parameters of exemption conditions. In 
reviewing the Commission’s “evasion” concern, one commentator 
appropriately noted that the purported justification fails to distinguish 
good faith capital-raising efforts (which are likely to be much more 
numerous) from those that are perhaps more suspect.107 Although this 
analysis is correct, the commentator’s recommendation that the 
integration doctrine be revised to focus on whether the company had a 
legitimate business reason for needing the additional capital108 carries 
the unfortunate burden of ambiguity. A legitimate business reason might 
exist for allowing multiple offerings where unanticipated financial needs 
arise, but even in such circumstances, one can imagine the SEC or civil 
litigants arguing as to what is truly unanticipated, with the burden of 
proof being placed on the issuer to justify the timing, needs, and 
amounts of its various offerings. 
The most serious flaw in the Commission’s justification for the 
integration doctrine is the notion that the doctrine is a necessary adjunct 
to the goal of investor protection.109 The underlying presumption is that 
registration exemptions do not provide adequate investor protection to 
potential purchasers. In fact, investor protection elements are contained 
in the various registration exemptions, as discussed below.110 It defies 
logic to conclude that the investor protection elements contained in the 
various exemptions are vitiated in an offering that fully complies with all 
exemption conditions when the issuer subsequently sells additional 
securities under another exemption that also fully complies with the 
exemption conditions for that offering. Suffice it to say that, at this 
point, the presumption of inadequate protection is a faulty one and belies 
the Commission’s own efforts to create investor safeguards within each 
of the various exemptions. 
                                                          
 107. Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formula That 
Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 228-29 (1994). 
 108. Id. at 238. 
 109. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 110. See infra Part V. 
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B. Inherent Ambiguities and Inconsistencies 
1.   The Five-Factor Test 
There are no bright-line tests to determine answers to any 
integration question under the SEC’s five-factor test. Nor has the 
Commission provided guidance as to the meaning or relative weights of 
the various factors.111 The ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in the 
test have been so thoroughly criticized that additional critique is 
superfluous.112 The ambiguities of the five elements essentially come 
down to an “eye of the beholder” determination. If a company raises 
$200,000 in March and the growth of the company requires raising an 
additional $300,000 in July, is that part of a “single plan of financing”? 
Even if the company had a business plan that called for raising $200,000 
in March and then, depending on the progress of the company, raising an 
additional $300,000 several months later if needed, is that contingency 
planning a “single plan of financing”? If a small start-up raises $700,000 
to finance equipment and four months later raises $500,000 to open a 
marketing office, does the fact that the entire $1,200,000 is employed to 
get the business off the ground mean that the offerings are for the “same 
general purpose”? There are no bright-line standards to answer these 
questions, yet the standards impose themselves upon every company that 
raises capital through more than a single offering. Those companies and 
their counsel may well agree with the conclusion by one commentator 
that the five-factor test has launched “more than [forty] years of 
ambiguity, confusion and contradiction.”113 
If issuers and their counsel are unable to determine whether discrete 
offerings will be combined under the integration doctrine, it is little 
comfort to advise a company that it can request a no-action letter from 
                                                          
 111. Theodore W. Jones, The Doctrine of Securities Act “Integration,” 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 320, 
325 n.24 (2001) (“Unfortunately, the Commission has never indicated which factors carry the most 
weight or just how many of these factors must be analyzed to suggest the absence of a relationship 
between offerings in order for an issuer to avoid integration. As such, any analysis under the five 
factors test involves inherent uncertainty.”). 
 112. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 237 (6th ed. 2009) 
(“The Commission has not provided any significant guidance as to how these [five factors] should 
be weighted . . . . The . . . guidelines . . . do not provide much certainty in planning exemptions.”); 
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 360 (4th ed. 2004) 
(stating that the “multifactor test may fairly be criticized as . . . indeterminate”); Perry E. Wallace, 
Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain for Small 
Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935, 989 (1988) (“The integration doctrine continues to 
frustrate issuers engaged in the capital formation process, engulfing them in a sea of ambiguity, 
uncertainty, and potential liability.”). 
 113. Jerald Cliff McKinney, II, Factoring the Ambiguity: A Futile Attempt to Understand the 
Ambiguous Nature of the Integration Doctrine’s Five-Factor Test, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 337, 337 
(2003). 
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SEC staff.114 For one, that is asking the company to go into the mouth of 
the tiger that invented, and is committed to, the doctrine. If the question 
boils down to the “single plan of financing” factor, which is often the 
most prevalent question, there is a dearth of practical guidance and the 
SEC’s application of this factor through no-action letter requests has, at 
best, “lacked consistency.”115 Moreover, SEC staff does not necessarily 
view capital-raising efforts in the same business-oriented light as issuers. 
Thus, for example, an issuer that distinguished an initial offering as 
“seed capital” from an offering two months later that it regarded as 
“long-term financing” was denied no-action relief.116 Another issuer who 
had a common stock offering followed by a convertible debenture 
offering was likewise denied a no-action letter because the debentures 
were convertible into common stock, and the SEC staff conflated the 
two securities regardless of their differing financial elements or the 
timing or likelihood of any eventual conversion.117 Even if an issuer 
receives a favorable no-action letter, there is the ever-present risk that 
the letter cannot be relied upon if there are any deviations from the 
described offering process—a precarious condition given the exigencies 
of particular financing needs and investor demands.118  
Recent Commission statements have been equally obtuse in 
defining the parameters of the integration doctrine. In its March 2015 
Release adopting revised Regulation A, the Commission stated: “[W]e 
believe that an offering made in reliance on Regulation A should not be 
integrated with another exempt offering made by the issuer, provided 
that each offering complies with the requirements of the exemption that 
is being relied upon for the particular offering.”119 At first glance, this 
statement looks like an acceptance of the sensible notion that 
                                                          
 114. See supra note 66. A no-action request details the issuer’s proposed offering and sets forth 
the issuer’s basis for concluding that the proposed conduct is permissible within a particular 
exemption or other statutory or regulatory requirement. No-Action Letters, supra note 66. 
 115. Deaktor, supra note 61, at 529; see also Daniel J. Morrisey, Integration of Securities 
Offerings—The ABA’s “Indiscreet” Proposal, SEC. L. REV., 1985, at 165 (“The letters are often 
difficult to harmonize even when they deal with analogous situations.”).  
 116. LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 78,136 (Sept. 16, 1985). 
 117. State St. Mortg. Co., SEC No-Action Letter [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 78,415 (Mar. 12, 1987); see also LaserFax, Inc. [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,136. 
 118. It should also be noted that no-action letters are staff opinions, not binding on the 
Commission. See No-Action Letters, supra note 66. Although an SEC enforcement action would be 
highly unlikely after a no-action letter has been granted, any slight deviation from the terms of the 
proposed offering could result in the negation of the staff opinion. See id. 
 119. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust 
Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,819 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
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independent exemptions will not be integrated, provided that each meets 
its own exemption terms. That does not appear to be the case. The 
statement is qualified by two examples of exempt offerings made 
concurrently with a Regulation A offering, with both examples being 
highly unlikely to occur.120 Moreover, the examples referencing 
“concurrent” offerings are problematic. When are two offerings in fact 
“concurrent” for integration purposes? The Regulation A integration 
provisions clearly apply the integration doctrine for most exempt 
offerings made within six months following a Regulation A offering.121 
If the non-Regulation A offering ends prior to the Regulation A offering, 
Regulation A already provides for no integration of those offerings.122 If 
the non-Regulation A offering ends subsequent to the Regulation A 
offering, the five-factor integration test will apply to offers and sales 
after the Regulation A offering ended.123 The Commission’s statement 
affirming the validity of independent exempt offerings does not add any 
new element to the integration equation. Given the risks and ambiguities 
inherent in the integration doctrine, it will be the rare counsel or 
company that advises or chooses to undertake an otherwise exempt 
offering concurrent with Regulation A. 
Courts seem a bit more understanding of, and responsive to, the 
plight of small businesses, although little practical guidance can be 
gleaned from the relatively few reported cases.124 Courts have denied 
plaintiff summary judgment motions on the grounds that the ambiguities 
                                                          
 120. See id. One example is an offering for which general solicitation is not permitted, such as 
a Rule 506(b) offering, being made concurrently with a Regulation A offering that has “tested the 
waters” through general solicitation of potential investors. Id. The second example is an offering 
that allows general solicitation, such as Rule 506(c), in which the offering also advertises the 
concurrent Regulation A offering. Id. The first example would fail the integration test if any of the 
Rule 506(b) offerees were solicited through the Regulation A “testing the waters” process. The 
second example would fail the integration test, per the SEC, if the Rule 506(c) materials did not 
provide sufficient Regulation A disclosures. Both examples are unusual insofar as it would be 
highly unlikely for a company to be raising money through concurrent Regulation A and private 
offerings, especially given the increased ceilings of $20 million (Tier 1) and $50 million (Tier 2) for 
Regulation A offerings and the marketing advantages of Regulation A offerings relative to private 
offerings. Id. at 21,807. 
 121. SEC Rule 251(c)(2) has an exclusive list of post-Regulation A offerings that are not 
subject to the integration test. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2) (2014). The only exempt offerings 
within that list are stock sales made pursuant to employee benefit plans, foreign transactions under 
Regulation S, and sales under the crowdfunding exemption of section 4(a)(6). Id. The exemption for 
sales under the crowdfunding exemption is a recent addition to Rule 251(c)(2). 80 Fed. Reg. at 
21,895. 
 122. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(1). 
 123. 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,895.  
 124. See, e.g., ABA Subcomm. on P’ships, Trusts and Unincorporated Ass’ns, supra note 98, 
at 1597 (“[V]ery few cases have provided an analysis that is instructive to counsel involved in 
securities offerings that present such issues.”). 
24 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3 
within the integration doctrine required more extensive findings of 
fact.125 In a case in which the issuer had engaged in six offerings within 
a two-and-a-half-year period, the District Court of Massachusetts 
expressed a clear sympathy for the issuer’s plight in not being able to 
obtain adequate financing and that “each successive financing was 
expected by the defendants to be the last.”126 The Southern District of 
New York court expressed a similar recognition of the financing 
problems facing small companies when it denied application of the 
integration doctrine where “unforeseen operating difficulties” required 
the issuer to undertake multiple offerings.127 
SEC enforcement actions and cases that have applied the 
integration doctrine are not numerous, yet the relative paucity of such 
actions does not render the doctrine benign for lack of force. There are 
cogent reasons for the lack of reported cases. Investors who might have 
integration-based claims may be satisfied with their economic return 
and, thus, would not desire to pursue a rescission remedy. For those 
investors who do make claims, the matters might be privately settled 
through buyouts or other economic arrangements. Despite the lack of 
reported violations, the integration doctrine’s bite is ever-present and 
significant. Companies aware of the doctrine or represented by counsel 
astute in securities laws may receive negative, or at best cautionary, 
                                                          
 125. See, e.g., SEC v. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., No. 10-CV-00621, 2013 WL 1000329, 
at *4 (D. Ida. Mar. 13, 2013); In re Veritas Fin. Corp., No. 05-10774, 2007 WL 2293009, at *1, *5 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007). 
 126. Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1106-07 (D. Mass. 1974). The 
district court in Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., stated: 
In the instant case, some basis for integration appears in the facts that (a) for the most 
part the offerings were made for the same general purpose, and (b) the parties recognized 
that the first financing in October, 1967 might be inadequate and additional financing 
might be required. On the other hand, everyone hoped and expected that the initial 
$630,000 would be sufficient to enable LPC [(a now bankrupt company for which the 
defendants sold unregistered securities)] to operate profitably. It was felt that deposits by 
tourists reserving places on package tours sponsored by LPC, known as the “customer 
deposit float,” would supplement its working capital sufficiently to enable it to prosper. 
Thereafter, each successive financing was expected by the defendants to be the last 
which would be required to make LPC self-supporting. A series of obstacles to 
profitability was encountered, many of them beyond the control of the company or the 
defendants who, incidentally, each invested $1,400,000 of their own funds. Specific 
acquisitions of subsidiaries and the charter of a cruise ship, MTS Orpheus, were not 
contemplated at the time of the first financing in October, 1967. The evidence simply did 
not show a single plan of financing. Moreover, the several offerings were not made at or 
about the same time, different classes of securities were issued and the prices of the 
securities varied. On balance, the integrated offering doctrine is clearly inapplicable. 
Id. at 1107. 
 127. Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., No. 72-CV-5111, 1976 WL 760, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 
1976). 
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advice as to whether planned offerings may go forward. Indecision could 
result in not moving forward with needed financing or, perhaps, altering 
plans in order to attempt to avoid integration’s application, such as 
offering a different class of securities than what was optimally 
considered.128 Lurking behind the integration doctrine is not only the 
potentiality of rescission actions against the company, but also personal 
liability of the company officers who participated in the offering 
process.129 Other less obvious problems could exist. Companies that 
undertake registered or Regulation A offerings are required to disclose 
prior offerings to the SEC.130 The Commission may take a hard, and 
potentially unhappy, look at the company’s history, as occurred in the 
Unity Gold case,131 and determine that prior securities offerings were 
invalid on account of the integration doctrine.132 Quite apart from the 
doctrine’s effect upon additional securities offerings, companies with 
integration problems based on past offerings may need to disclose 
contingent liabilities in their financial statements given to lenders or 
other third parties. 
2.   The Six-Month Safe Harbors 
The six-month safe harbors applicable to Rule 147, Regulation A, 
and Regulation D exemptions133 have the virtue of creating a clear  
cut-off for the integration doctrine. However, the safe harbors are not a 
panacea, especially for small and developing companies. Six months is 
an arbitrary time frame that, for many smaller companies, may be too 
long a period to wait before safely raising additional capital. In 2006, the 
SEC’s own advisory committee recognized this problem when it 
recommended reducing the safe harbors to thirty days, a 
                                                          
 128. See, e.g., Deaktor, supra note 61, at 473-74 (“[A]n issuer uncertain of the applicability of 
integration to a proposed offering may be forced to forego the proposed offering altogether or to 
adjust its characteristics significantly to avoid a potential violation of the registration requirements. 
Either course of action may entail considerable hardship for the issuer.”). 
 129. Defendants in section 12(a)(1) actions may include individuals who solicited purchasers 
on behalf of the issuer. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1988) (remanding the case to 
lower courts to determine whether purchaser of securities in private offering who solicited others to 
purchase was soliciting on behalf of the issuer rather than giving gratuitous advice). 
 130. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.701, 239.90 (2014). Item 701 of Regulation S-K, which sets forth 
disclosure requirements for registered offerings, requires issuers to detail all unregistered sales of 
securities in the prior three years. 17 C.F.R. § 229.701. Item 6 of Part I of Form 1-A used in a 
Regulation A offering requires disclosure of all unregistered securities issued or sold during the 
prior year. 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2014).  
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
 132. Unity Gold Corporation, Securities Act Release No. 530, 1938 WL 34099, at *6 (July 19, 
1938). 
 133. For a description of the integration doctrine’s six-month safe harbors, see supra text 
accompanying notes 88-93. 
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recommendation that would have effectively eliminated the integration 
doctrine.134 While regarding thirty days as too short a time frame, the 
Commission was sensitive to the fact that six months may be too long a 
period in some circumstances and, therefore, in response to the Advisory 
Committee, proposed reducing the integration safe harbor period to 
ninety days.135 Inexplicably, and without comment, this proposal was 
never adopted. The six-month periods remain, although equally 
inexplicably, the safe harbors do not apply to all exemptions. The 
intrastate section 3(a)(11) statutory exemption and the private offering 
section 4(a)(2) statutory exemption do not benefit from the regulatory 
safe harbors. Offerings under those statutory exemptions continue to be 
saddled with timing and criteria uncertainties. Indeed, strict 
interpretation of the regulatory safe harbors could lead to the rather 
absurd result that a section 4(a)(2) offering in January might be 
integrated with a Rule 506 offering in September, but the Rule 506 
offering would have the protection against integration afforded by its 
six-month safe harbor.136 
                                                          
 134. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES  
TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 94-96 (2006), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsps/acspc-finalreport.pdf. 
 135. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 
8828, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007). The Commission’s report noted: 
The current six-month time frame of the safe harbor in Rule 502(a) provides a 
substantial time period that has worked well to clearly differentiate two similar offerings 
and provide time for the market to assimilate the effects of the prior offering. The 
Advisory Committee has expressed concern, however, that such a long delay could 
inhibit companies, particularly smaller companies, from meeting their capital needs. We 
recognize that increased volatility in the capital markets and advances in information 
technology have changed the landscape of private offerings. We remain concerned, 
however, that an inappropriately short time frame could allow issuers to undertake serial 
Rule 506-exempt offerings each month to up to 35 non-accredited investors in reliance 
on the safe harbor, resulting in unregistered sales to hundreds of non-accredited investors 
in a year. Such sales could result in large numbers of non-accredited investors failing to 
receive the protections of Securities Act registration. Our proposal seeks to strike an 
appropriate balance between the number of non-accredited investors allowed in an 
offering relying on the integration safe harbor and the non-public nature of that offering. 
It would be an anomalous result that an issuer could make an offering to hundreds of 
non-accredited investors in reliance on the integration safe harbor, triggering reporting 
requirements under the Exchange Act, without a public offering. We propose, therefore, 
to lower the safe harbor time frame to 90 days rather than the 30 days recommended by 
the Advisory Committee. We believe 90 days is appropriate, as it would permit an issuer 
to rely on the safe harbor once every fiscal quarter. 
Id.  
 136. This rather odd result is due to the apparent “one-way” integration provision of Rule 
502(a) of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2014) (“Offers and sales that are made more than 
six months before the start of a Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after 
completion of a Regulation D offering will not be considered part of that Regulation D 
offering . . . .”). Among other inconsistencies in the integration doctrine is the broader “two-way” 
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Variations among time frames are not the only inconsistencies 
within the integration doctrine. If the SEC is concerned about 
circumvention of registration requirements, why did it eliminate 
integration with regard to any offering that precedes a Regulation A 
offering regardless of timing or amount?137 And having eliminated the 
integration doctrine for offerings that precede a Regulation A offering, 
why did the SEC impose the doctrine upon post-Regulation A 
offerings?138 Why does integration specifically apply to Rule 504 
offerings up to $1 million, yet the SEC has eliminated integration for the 
so-called “crowdfunding exemption,” which also exempts up to $1 
million of capital raised?139 If companies engage in “bridge financing” to 
raise capital prior to a forthcoming registered initial public offering 
(“IPO”),140 why does SEC Rule 152 eliminate integration for 
section 4(a)(2) and Rule 506 private offerings that precede a registered 
offering but retain the integration doctrine for bridge financing effected 
under Rule 504, Rule 505, or the intrastate registration exemptions?141 
Similarly, why does Rule 155 create an integration safe harbor (and after 
only thirty days, not six months) for withdrawn registration statements 
followed by private offerings but not for any other exempt offerings 
following a withdrawn registration?142 
Inconsistencies within the integration doctrine are inexplicable and 
lead to illogical results and mistakes in planning securities offerings. 
                                                          
provision in Rule 251(c) of Regulation A. Id. § 230.251(c). 
 137. Id. § 230.251(c)(1). 
 138. Rule 251(c)(2) contains a limited list of post-Regulation A offerings that are not subject to 
integration with the Regulation A and includes a six-month safe harbor similar to Regulation D. Id. 
§ 230.251(c)(2).  
 139. See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, Exchange Act Release No. 76,324, 
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,499 (Nov. 16, 2015) (adopting an amendment specifying no integration in 
crowdfunding exemptions with any other securities offering). 
 140. “Bridge financing” refers to the period just prior to a public offering during which the 
company needs capital to finance the interim period and the public offering expenses. Bridge 
Financing, BUSINESSFINANCE.COM (June 19, 2007), http://www.businessfinance.com/articles/ 
bridge-financing.htm. 
 141. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152. In a similar vein, Rule 255(e) of Regulation A, which applies to a 
Regulation A offering that is abandoned in favor of a registered offering, creates an integration 
distinction depending on whether during the Regulation A offering the issuer had solicited only 
qualified institutional buyers and accredited investors, or whether there had been solicitation of the 
lesser masses. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust 
Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,899 (Apr. 20, 2015). In the latter case, the 
issuer must wait at least thirty calendar days between the last solicitation and the filing of the 
registration statement. Id. There is no compelling evidence that such a thirty-day waiting period 
provides needed investor protection given the technical requirements and intended safeguards of a 
registered offering. 
 142. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.155. 
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Companies might learn too late that the integration impediment could 
have been avoided by use of a different exemption in earlier offerings. 
For example, suppose a company raised $4 million in a Regulation A 
offering and three months later needs an additional $2 million for current 
operational expenses. The integration doctrine is likely to invalidate any 
short-term subsequent offering as well as the initial Regulation A 
offering.143 However, had the company’s initial offering of $4 million 
been made under Rule 505 or Rule 506 of Regulation D, a later 
Regulation A offering would not be integrated with the earlier offering, 
and the financing could be achieved without integration risk.144 Reason 
defies logic for such a result. 
V. IS THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE NECESSARY FOR  
INVESTOR PROTECTION? 
Investor protection is the undisputed primary goal of securities 
laws.145 That is what motivated the enactment of the 1933 Act following 
the enormous investor losses incurred prior to and during the Great 
Depression.146 Investor protection was sought to be achieved through a 
variety of means, including agency review of registration statements 
prior to any public offering, specific standards for disclosure in 
registration statements, agency rulemaking authority, the continued 
application of state securities laws,147 and specific provisions for civil, 
administrative, and criminal sanctions applicable to registered and 
exempt offerings in the event of disclosure violations.148 
                                                          
 143. Regulation A will be subject to integration under the five-factor test for any subsequent 
offers within six months except registered offerings and foreign offerings under Regulation S. Id. 
§ 230.251(c)(2). The only exception would be a Regulation S offering directed solely to foreign 
purchasers outside the United States. Regulation S offerings do not integrate with any registration 
exemptions. Id. § 230.251(c)(2)(iv).  
 144. Regulation A offerings are not integrated with any prior offerings. Id. § 230.251(c)(1) 
(“Offers and sales made in reliance on this Regulation A will not be integrated with: (1) prior offers 
or sales of securities . . . .”). 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
 146. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 147. Section 18 of the 1933 Act specifically preserved state authority to regulate securities 
offerings made within the state. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2012). 
Since 1933, there has been some limited preemption of state registration provisions for certain types 
of offerings, but state antifraud provisions continue to apply to all offers and sales regardless of 
federal registration or federal exemption from registration. See, e.g., Small Business and the SEC, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2014).  
 148. The 1933 Act antifraud provisions applicable to exempt offerings are section 12(a)(2) and 
section 17. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. Investors also have available  
Rule 10b-5 remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), as well as state law 
remedies. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. 
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The drafters of the 1933 Act recognized that the registration process 
is not necessary for some types of securities offerings.149 The 1933 Act 
thus sought to strike a balance between offerings for which an agency-
reviewed registration was necessary and offerings for which the public 
interest did not require registration. Nowhere among any of the 
exemptions listed in sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act, or the 
authorization for additional rule-based exemptions, was there any 
suggestion that issuers could not utilize multiple registration exemptions 
concurrently or within a relatively short time span. The natural question 
to ask, therefore, is whether the SEC’s integration doctrine is a necessary 
or appropriate factor for the protection of investors. Given the 
Commission’s own acknowledgement that its integration doctrine 
imposes a burden on the ability of companies to take advantage of 
registration exemptions,150 the integration doctrine can only be justified 
if it provides a necessary element of investor protection. The doctrine’s 
continued existence must be seriously questioned if it is extraneous to 
the principal purpose of the 1933 Act while imposing an unquestioned 
burden upon small business financing. 
From the perspective of investor protection, the SEC’s 
“circumvention” justification fails to account for the fact that each 
registration exemption carries its own distinct set of conditions intended 
to foster both capital formation and investor protection. Each time an 
issuer utilizes a registration exemption, it is done in accordance with 
existing statutory, regulatory, and judicially imposed substantive 
conditions. Issuers’ reliance upon specific exemption conditions raises 
an interesting question, as section 19(a) of the 1933 Act contains a 
curious “good faith” provision stating: 
No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act 
done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation 
of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, 
after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be determined 
by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.151  
Given the ambiguities inherent in the integration doctrine, it may be 
plausible to consider whether this statutory provision exculpates issuers 
who engage in multiple offerings in good faith believing that they are 
not violating the integration elements. 
                                                          
§ 240.10b-5 (2014).  
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 discussing statutory registration exemptions 
and the delegation of administrative authority to create additional registration exemptions. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 151. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a). 
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 It is safe to presume, indeed unfathomable to conclude otherwise, 
that the terms of each exemption were thoroughly vetted by the SEC 
relative to the goal of investor protection. The SEC’s pejorative 
“circumvention” characterization of an issuer’s decision to engage in 
two or more offerings ignores the fact that the issuer has acted entirely 
within the exemption provisions containing specific conditions intended 
to protect potential investors. Examination of the principal registration 
exemptions reflects these investor protection elements. 
A. The Private Offering Exemptions 
Section 4(a)(2) simply, and without definition, exempts 
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”152 It did 
not take long for the SEC to give content to this enigmatic statutory 
phrase. A 1935 Interpretive Release focused on the number of offerees 
and their relationship to the issuer, the number of units offered, the size 
of the offering and the manner of offering.153 The exemption was given 
further, and significant, substantive content in the Supreme Court’s 1953 
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.154 decision that emphasized the personal 
qualifications of, and degree of, disclosure to potential investors.155 The 
Court held that in determining the conditions for a registration 
exemption, “inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the 
protections afforded by registration.”156 The issue for the Court was 
whether the offerees could “fend for themselves” without a registration 
process.157 Focus was therefore upon the capacity of the potential 
purchaser to understand the risks and merits of the offering, including 
whether the potential investor had access to sufficient information to 
make an informed decision.158 
Investor protection elements are equally evident in Rule 506—the 
SEC-created regulatory private offering exemption. Prior to the mandate 
of the JOBS Act, there was only one Rule 506 exemption.159 Today there 
                                                          
 152. Id. § 4(a)(2). This exemption was initially section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, later became 
section 4(2), and as a result of the JOBS Act, is now set forth in section 4(a)(2). See supra note 31. 
 153. Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in Determining the 
Availability of the Exemption From Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), 
Securities Act Release No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935). 
 154. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).  
 155. Id. at 124-25.  
 156. Id. at 127. 
 157. Id. at 125. 
 158. Id. at 127 (“The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information 
which registration would disclose.”). 
 159. The JOBS Act mandated that the SEC develop an alternative Rule 506 exemption that 
allowed general advertising and solicitation if all of the purchasers are accredited investors. 
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are two: Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c). The initial Rule 506 explicitly 
adopted the Ralston Purina requirement that investors be able to fend for 
themselves. As reflected in Rule 506(b), each purchaser must have “such 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is 
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective 
investment.”160 Excluded from this so-called “sophistication 
requirement” is a set of purchasers defined as “accredited investors,” 
who are presumed by reason of their financial capacities or particular 
relationship to the issuer to possess the requisite knowledge and 
experience to be qualified purchasers.161 In addition to the personal 
qualification provisions: non-accredited investors, of which the issuer 
must reasonably believe that there are no more than thirty-five,162 are 
required to receive specific disclosures described in Rule 502(b);163 
securities purchased in any Rule 506 offering are deemed “restricted,” 
meaning that they cannot be readily resold except under prescribed 
conditions;164 and all purchasers are entitled to the protections of anti-
fraud provisions.165 Moreover, Rule 506(d) prohibits the use of the 
exemption if the issuer, its predecessors and affiliated issuers, or any of 
its directors, certain officers, promoters, twenty percent beneficial 
owners, or specified other persons, are subject to a “disqualifying 
                                                          
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012). 
 160. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014). It is sufficient if the issuer has a reasonable belief 
that the purchaser possesses such qualifications. See id. A potential investor lacking such 
qualifications might nevertheless become a purchaser if he or she, together with his or her purchaser 
representative, possesses such qualifications. See id. 
 161. Id. § 230.501(a). The accredited investor concept was initially created for the statutory 
section 4(5) exemption created in 1980 for offerings limited to accredited investors. A definition of 
accredited investors was added as section 2(a)(15) of the 1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933 
§ 2(a)(15), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012); Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-477, § 603, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294. The SEC then incorporated the statutory definition of 
accredited investor into Regulation D on the basis that “certain purchasers would be presumed to 
meet the purchase qualifications, thereby eliminating the need for subjective judgments by the 
issuer about the suitability of such investors.” Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the 
Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and 
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 23 SEC Docket 446 (Aug. 7, 1981).  
 162. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i). 
 163. Id. § 230.502(b). The extent of the disclosure varies depending on the total amount of the 
issuer’s offering and whether the issuer is a 1934 Act reporting company. See id.  
 164. Id. § 230.502(d). Rule 144 imposes minimum holding periods for restricted securities to 
assure, in part, that such securities are not quickly transferred into the hands of persons who may not 
have been qualified initial purchasers. Id. § 230.144(d).  
 165. The principal enforcement actions in the event of a material disclosure problem would be 
an SEC action under section 17 of the 1933 Act and either administrative or private actions under 
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). Issuers 
are also subject to potential criminal prosecutions under both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, as well as 
state law statutory and common law sanctions. 
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event.”166 These events are defined to include criminal convictions in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security and other specified 
crimes, certain court injunctions, SEC and other specified agency orders, 
and other enumerated events.167 
The substantial investor protection measures within the statutory 
and regulatory private offering exemptions leave neither room nor need 
for an integration requirement. The integration doctrine does not fill any 
gap in investor protection elements. The doctrine simply melds two or 
more offerings into one. But for what substantive end if each of the 
offerings has satisfied all investor protection conditions imposed by the 
particular exemptions? 
B. The Regulation A Exemption 
From an investor protection perspective, the integration doctrine 
fares no better when considering the Regulation A exemption. 
Regulation A requirements include issuer eligibility, disclosure to 
potential investors, timing of offers and sales, amounts to be offered, 
disqualifications for prior misdeeds by the issuer, its affiliates, or 
underwriters, and limitations on pre-offering solicitations.168 In contrast 
to all other exemptions, the Regulation A disclosure document is 
reviewed in advance by the SEC.169 The Regulation A exemption is as 
near to a registered offering as an issuer can get.170 Yet, the SEC applies 
the integration doctrine to post-Regulation A offerings. If an issuer 
engages in a Regulation A offering followed two months later by a Rule 
506(b) offering, the two offerings may be integrated under the SEC’s 
                                                          
 166. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. §§ 230.251(a)–(b), .251(d), .252, .254, .262. In March 2015, the SEC divided 
Regulation A into two distinct exemptions: Tier 1 for offers up to $20 million; and Tier 2 for offers 
up to $50 million. See supra note 39. If securities sold in a Tier 2 offering are not to be listed on a 
national securities exchange, all purchasers must either be accredited investors or be subject to 
certain limitations on their investments. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions 
Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release 
No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807-09 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
 169. 17. C.F.R. § 230.252. 
 170. It should also be noted that most states do not have a registration exemption that ties into 
Regulation A. Tier 2 Regulation A offerings are exempt from state registration provisions. 
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), 
80 Fed. Reg. at 21,861-62; Amendments to Regulation A: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/regulation-a-amendments-
secg.shtml#7 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). If the issuer is planning a Tier 1 Regulation offering up to 
$20 million with a broad marketing effort, the issuer will need to register the offering in every state 
where registration is required, thus providing to prospective purchasers a full disclosure document 
as well as subjecting the issuer to state review and state-based sanctions. Amendments to Regulation 
A: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, supra. 
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five-factor test, resulting in the loss of exemption for both offerings.171 
In both cases, the investors were fully protected by the terms of the 
specific exemption under which they made their purchases. The 
integration doctrine added nothing to investor protection. The  
doctrine would, however, if applied, invalidate two otherwise perfectly 
sound capital-raising efforts, each following prescribed investor 
protection provisions. 
C. The Rule 504 and Rule 505 Exemptions 
It is equally difficult to perceive how the integration doctrine adds 
any element of investor protection for either the Rule 504 or the  
Rule 505 Regulation D exemptions. Rule 504 is a fairly open-ended 
exemption with neither disclosure nor purchaser qualification 
conditions.172 However, the issuer cannot engage in general advertising 
and solicitation, which is a major hurdle for small businesses, unless the 
offering is registered under a state registration provision or is sold 
exclusively to accredited investors under state accredited investor 
exemptions.173 Rule 504 also has an aggregation provision that limits the 
amount raised under that exemption within a twelve-month period.174 
And, although Rule 504 does not itself have any mandatory disclosure 
requirement, if there are any material misstatements or omissions in any 
offering materials or statements, investors have remedies readily 
available under federal and state antifraud provisions.175 Thus, although 
Rule 504 has the least technical conditions of all exemptions, it would 
challenge credibility to conclude that the SEC deliberately set out to 
create an exemption that did not adequately protect investors. The 
relatively low monetary ceiling, the regulatory force of state law, and the 
ever-present potential application of civil, administrative, or even 
criminal sanctions for disclosure failures combine to provide substantial 
investor protection elements. The Rule 505 exemption goes even further 
than Rule 504, with mandated disclosures to non-accredited investors,176 
                                                          
 171. When combined, the two offerings will not be able to satisfy any exemption. The 
Regulation A offering involved general advertising, forbidden for Rule 506(b), and the Rule 506(b) 
offering was effected without any SEC filing, thus eliminating Regulation A as a possibility. 
 172. Rule 504 allows offerings up to $1 million. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. But see Securities Act 
Release No. 9973, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,786, 69,832 (Nov. 10, 2015) (proposing the elevation of the Rule 
504 capital ceiling to $5 million). Rule 504 has no purchaser qualifications nor mandated disclosure 
requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. 
 173. Id. § 230.504(b)(1).  
 174. Id. § 230.504(b)(2). For the text of the aggregation provision, see infra note 192. 
 175. Rule 504 is regarded as a public offering, and therefore, section 12(a)(2) remedies are 
available to purchasers, as well the ability to make claims under Rule 10b-5. 
 176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(1) (incorporating the disclosure requirements of Rule 502(b)). 
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a limit on the number of non-accredited investors,177 “bad actor” 
disqualification, and prohibitions against general advertising and 
solicitation178 that apply regardless of any state registrations. 
D. The Intrastate Offering Exemptions 
The 1933 Act left the regulation of intrastate offerings to the states. 
The SEC so noted in a 1937 Interpretive Release stating that an 
“[e]xemption under Section 3(a)(11), if in fact available, removes the 
securities from the operation of all provisions of the Act except those of 
Sections 12(2) and 17.”179 Despite the hands-off admission, the SEC 
nevertheless imposes its integration doctrine on section 3(a)(11) 
offerings.180 The initial basis for imposing the doctrine is the reference to 
“part of an issue” in the 1933 Act’s exemption provision.181 This 
semantic reed suffers from major flaws. First, the “part of an issue” 
phrase is not found directly or analogously in any other registration 
exemption or in the delegation of authority to the SEC to create 
additional exemptions. It would be strange to conclude that the 1933 Act 
intended to create an integration concept for the intrastate exemption, 
but not for any other exemption. If the framers of the 1933 Act had 
intended to limit the availability of exemptions under an integration 
concept, it would not have been difficult to draft appropriate limiting 
language. Secondly, the “part of an issue” phrase is subject to alternative 
interpretations at least as plausible, and perhaps more so, than the SEC’s 
position that looks at prior or subsequent offerings. The 1933 Act’s key 
 
 
                                                          
 177. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (limiting the offering to no more than thirty-five non-accredited 
investors). 
 178. Id. § 230.505(b)(1)–(2)(iii) (importing the “bad actor” provisions of Rule 262 applicable 
to Regulation A offerings, and incorporating the prohibition against general advertising and 
solicitation of Rule 502(c)). 
 179. Letter of General Counsel Discussing Nature of the Exemption from Registration 
Provided by Section 3(a)(11), Securities Act Release No. 1459, 1937 WL 29095 (May 29, 1937). 
Sections 12(2) and 17 are antifraud provisions applicable to potential disclosure violations. See 
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(a)(2), 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l(a)(2), 77q (2012). 
 180. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c). Curiously, integration only applies to post-, not pre-Regulation A 
offerings. See id. 
 181. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11) (“Any security which is a part of an issue offered and 
sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory . . . .”). In its December 1961 
Release, the Commission cited its prior Unity Gold Corp. decision, see supra note 79, indicating 
that “[w]hether an offering is ‘a part of an issue’, that is, whether it is an integrated part of an 
offering previously made or proposed to be made, is a question of fact and depends essentially upon 
whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or program.” Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local 
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961 WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6, 1961). 
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term “issue” is not defined. It is entirely plausible to consider the term 
“issue” to refer to the particular, identified set of securities being offered 
for sale under the intrastate exemption. Within that group of securities, 
no offers or sales may be made to any non-residents. This reading is 
consistent with the first interpretative question to come under 
section 3(a)(11)—namely, whether an issuer undertaking a proposed 
registered offering could sell some of the soon-to-be registered shares 
under the intrastate exemption until the registration became effective.182 
The negative answer was fundamentally consistent with the “issue” 
concept, as the same securities that were being registered were also 
proposed to be sold in the intrastate offering. 
When one looks at the fundamental question of investor protection, 
section 3(a)(11) offerings are subject to state registration requirements 
when there are broad-scale marketing efforts.183 If the offerings are not 
state registered, state registration exemptions generally contain investor 
protection measures such as maximum numbers of investors, limiting 
marketing constraints, and restrictions on commissions to sales 
personnel.184 With regard to the SEC’s own Rule 147, one need go no 
further than the Commission’s own statement that “adoption of the 
rule . . . is in the public interest, since it will be consistent with the 
protection of investors.”185 
E. Integration as an Unnecessary and Potentially Harmful Doctrine 
If, as appears, each registration exemption has its own set of 
adequate investor protection elements, there is no policy justification for 
denying the validity of one offering simply because it could be deemed 
on an abstract, ambiguous basis to be “part of” or related to another 
offering. The primary goal of investor protection having been met, the 
integration doctrine adds nothing.186 Adding nothing would be a benign 
                                                          
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80. 
 183. See UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 202, 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2005). 
 184. State registration exemptions tend to be very limited in terms of number of purchasers and 
restraints on marketing. See id. § 202(14). 
 185. Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities Act of 1933—“Part of an Issue,” 
“Person Resident,” and “Doing Business Within” for Purposes of Section 3(a)(11) of that Act, 
Securities Act Release No. 5450, 3 SEC Docket 349, at *1 (Jan. 7, 1974). 
 186. It may be argued that by forcing issuers to engage in a registered offering, the integration 
doctrine allows investors to sue for disclosure violations under section 11 of the 1933 Act—a 
provision that applies only to registered offerings and allows for no defense by the issuer. 
Disclosure violations in exempt offerings will generally need to be addressed in civil actions under 
Rule 10b-5, which allows issuers a scienter defense. See STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES 
COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES chs. 19-21 (2015). Thus, it could be argued, 
registration creates a greater potential benefit for investors because of the easier ability to recover if 
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effect were it not for the clear adverse impact of the doctrine  
on capital financing. 
Moreover, the integration doctrine may be counter-productive to 
the goal of investor protection. By creating impediments to capital 
formation, the integration doctrine may deny to companies the capacity 
to raise capital that may be needed to strengthen the value of investments 
held by existing shareholders. If the integration doctrine inhibits or 
delays a company’s financing capacity, existing shareholders, as well as 
creditors and employees, may suffer the economic consequences. The 
formalistic integration doctrine is more than simply a hindrance—it is 
antagonistic to the financial needs of smaller companies and those who 
rely upon their economic capacities.187 
                                                          
there are disclosure violations. The argument, however, is flawed for several reasons. One is that 
small businesses concerned about the potential application of the integration doctrine are very 
unlikely to choose registration as an alternative, as such companies do not have the capacity to 
engage in registered offerings. Secondly, purchasers in exempt offerings other than private offerings 
can utilize section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act to bring actions based on disclosure violations, and it is 
a provision that allows the issuer a due diligence defense, even though it is quite difficult for issuers 
to defend disclosure violations on such grounds. See id. Finally, purchasers in all exempt offerings 
have the full panoply of state law remedies available, both statutory and common law. Many states 
have broader provisions allowing for investor actions than exist at the federal level. See id. 
 187. Elimination of the integration doctrine as applied to federal registration exemptions will 
not affect state laws that have similar integration provisions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 516.061(c) (West 2007). The Official Commentary to the 2002 Uniform Securities Act 
specifically adopts the federal integration doctrine for the limited offering exemption set forth in its 
section 202(14). UNIF. SEC. ACT cmt. 15 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2005). Some states have incorporated integration provisions into their statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 516.061(c). Although such provisions would remain regardless of SEC action, elimination 
of the federal doctrine would nevertheless have a material impact. By far the most commonly used 
federal exemption is Rule 506, which preempts state registration and exemption provisions. Based 
on an SEC sponsored survey for the years 2009-2012, Rule 506 offerings constituted ninety-nine 
percent of all amounts sold under Regulation D, of which more than two-thirds of those offerings 
were for amounts that could have utilized Rule 504 or Rule 505 exemptions. VLADIMIR IVANOV & 
SCOTT BAUGUESS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF 
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009-2012, AN UPDATE OF 
THE FEBRUARY 2012 STUDY 3 (2013). During the same 2009-2012 period, there were only nineteen 
Regulation A offerings, as compared to approximately 27,500 Regulation D offerings up to  
$5 million (the Regulation A ceiling.) Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues 
Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange 
Act Release No. 71,120, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2493, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3928 (Jan. 23, 
2014). If, and when, the SEC adopts rules for the enlarged Regulation A exemption and the 
crowdfunding exemption, those exemptions will also preempt state registration and exemption laws. 
State integration provisions will only be applicable to a relatively small number of offerings. In non-
preempted instances, such as intrastate offerings and Rule 504 offerings, state law will usually 
require registration, a costly and tedious process, which companies are not likely to undertake 
without assuring that they are raising sufficient capital to meet foreseeable and contingent expenses. 
2015] KEEP SECURITIES REFORM MOVING 37 
VI. LIMITED RETENTION OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE FOR 
NUMERICALLY BASED EXEMPTIONS 
The argument for elimination of the integration doctrine presumes 
that most issuers that engage in multiple offerings are acting in good 
faith to meet capital needs. There is, however, one instance where the 
integration doctrine may be justified—namely where the exemption 
specifically limits the number of purchasers. Rules 505 and 506(b) are 
the only two exemptions with such limits, both of which require that  
the issuer reasonably believe that there are not more than thirty-five  
non-accredited investors.188 One can imagine an issuer conducting a 
Rule 505 or Rule 506(b) offering that reaches the maximum thirty-five 
non-accredited purchasers and then immediately embarking on another 
nominally different Rule 505 or Rule 506(b) offering to additional  
non-accredited potential investors. If such multiple offerings occur one 
after the other, or within a relatively short time frame, the offerings 
would effectively emasculate the numerical limitations. Such tactics, if 
permitted, would render the numerical limitations moot.189 If numerical 
limitations are to retain any force and effect, the integration doctrine will 
need to apply to follow-on offerings for numerically limited exemptions 
that simply parrot the initial offering. The possibility of follow-on 
Rule 506 offerings that result in sales to numerous non-accredited 
investors was cited by the Commission as a reason for not reducing the 
integration safe harbor to thirty days as recommended by its Advisory 
Committee, and instead the Commission proposed, but never adopted, a 
reduction of the safe harbor time frame to ninety days.190 Adoption of 
that reduced time frame would be reasonable and appropriate for 
numerically based exemptions. In all other instances, the integration 
doctrine should be eliminated. 
                                                          
 188. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), .506(b)(2)(i) (2014). 
 189. One may appropriately question the Rule 505 and Rule 506(b) numerical limitations. The 
need for such a limitation seems particularly inappropriate for Rule 506(b), as all non-accredited 
purchasers are by definition sophisticated or represented by qualified purchaser representatives. It 
seems quite arbitrary to limit such purchasers in any numerical way. Although Rule 505 purchasers 
are not required to have the same purchaser qualifications as exist in Rule 506, the numerical 
limitation in Rule 505 may also be seriously questioned. There are no numerical limitations for 
either intrastate or Rule 504 offerings, which, unlike Rule 505, do not have any disclosure 
requirements as a condition of the exemption. What purpose is served by limiting Rule 505 non-
accredited investors to thirty-five? The numerical limitation simply hampers companies in their 
capital-raising efforts, but adds nothing of substance to investor protection concerns. If the 
Commission could provide a plausible explanation for why there is a numerical limitation, or why it 
is not fifty, or one hundred, perhaps the condition could be understood. As is, the numerical 
condition is simply another unnecessary hindrance to financing efforts by smaller companies, many 
of whom do not have access to large numbers of accredited investors. 
 190. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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A. Exemptions with Monetary Limitations 
Three exemptions from registration have monetary ceilings: Rule 
504; Rule 505; and Regulation A.191 If there is a basis for retaining the 
integration doctrine for exemptions with numerical limitations, does a 
similar basis apply to exemptions with monetary ceilings? The answer is 
clearly no, since all of these exemptions include aggregation conditions. 
Rule 504 is limited to $1 million.192 If a company uses Rule 504 to raise 
$1 million, and then immediately starts another $1 million Rule 504 
offering, or any other offering under a section 3(b) exemption, the 
second offering would run afoul of the Rule 504 aggregation provisions. 
The aggregation provisions make multiple short-term Rule 504 offerings 
impossible. Aggregation would not be applicable if a Rule 504 offering 
was followed by a Rule 506(b) or Rule 506(c) offering, as those rules are 
not section 3(b) exemptions. However, in light of the investor protection 
provisions contained in each of the respective exemptions, particularly 
given the personal qualification provisions in Rule 506(b) and  
Rule 506(c), there is no viable justification for integrating Rule 504 and 
Rule 506 offerings. Similarly, a company is very unlikely to engage in 
multiple short-term Rule 505 offerings. Rule 505 is also subject to 
aggregation provisions that would limit successive Rule 505 offerings 
that together exceed $5 million.193 If the company thinks that it has the 
capacity to raise more than $5 million, it would be much better served by 
using Rule 506(b) or Rule 506(c), which have no monetary ceilings. 
Regulation A also has an aggregation provision that limits the total 
amount raised under Regulation A offerings within a twelve-month 
period to $5 million.194 One need not apply an integration concept to 
follow-on Regulation A offerings as aggregation supplies the monetary 
limit. Follow-on Rule 504 or Rule 505 offerings would run afoul of the 
aggregation provisions contained within each of those rules. A follow-on 
Rule 506 offering could result in more than $5 million being raised 
within a twelve-month period, but the requirements for both 
Regulation A and Rule 506 are so substantial, and the investor protection 
elements so strong, that there is no policy justification for denying a 
 
                                                          
 191. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(b), .504(b)(2), .505(b)(2)(i). 
 192. Id. § 230.504(b)(2) (“The aggregate offering price for an offering of securities under this 
[Rule 504] . . . shall not exceed $1,000,000, less the aggregate offering price for all securities sold 
within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering of securities under this [Rule 
504], in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b), or in violation of section 5(a) of the 
Securities Act.”). 
 193. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i). 
 194. Id. § 230.251(b). 
2015] KEEP SECURITIES REFORM MOVING 39 
company the ability to raise additional funds in a post-Regulation A 
private offering regardless of timing or purpose. 
B. Related Companies 
The integration doctrine has also been applied to related companies 
with substantial overlapping ownership that engage in concurrent 
offerings for similar business purposes.195 This is an atypical situation 
that hinges principally on the question of the issuer’s true identity. If, in 
fact, the apparently distinct entities have no material separate existence, 
it is entirely appropriate to determine that the supposedly distinct 
offerings must be combined within a single exemption. This result is 
consistent with an ABA report that focused on the economic 
independence of the issuers.196 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The integration doctrine might be justifiable if it served a policy 
goal consistent with the 1933 Act. However, that is not the case. Instead, 
the doctrine is simply formalistic, inherently ambiguous, inconsistent in 
application, and contrary to the broadly accepted national goals to foster 
and promote small business capital formation.197 No patchwork 
modification should be undertaken, such as an effort to redefine or 
clarify the Commission’s five-factor test. When issuers engage in 
multiple offerings within a relatively short period of time, the primary 
question should be whether such offerings complied with the issuer’s 
chosen exemption.198 Such an analysis would be consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that, in determining the conditions for a 
registration exemption, “inquiry should be on the need . . . for the 
protections afforded by registration.”199 Every registration exemption 
contains significant investor protection elements.200 If the Commission 
believes otherwise, the proper course is to modify exemption 
requirements, not to artificially join two or more distinct offerings into 
 
 
                                                          
 195. See, e.g., Thomas H. Chambers, SEC No-Action Letter [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,618 (June 28, 1976) (denying a no-action letter for an offering by distinct 
oil and gas drilling limited partnerships where there was an overlap in general partners and 
contractual relationships). 
 196. A.B.A. Subcomm. on P’ships, Trusts and Unincorporated Ass’ns, supra note 98, at 1610.  
 197. See supra Part IV. 
 198. See supra Part V. 
 199. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953). 
 200. See supra Part V.A–D. 
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one. The Commission should recognize, and if it does not,  
Congress should mandate, that the integration doctrine should be 
eliminated for all but the narrowest of circumstances involving 
numerically based exemptions. 
 
